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In this article, I demonstrate that the Karen National Union (KNU) was able to manipulate and po-
liticise humanitarian aid in the Thailand-Burma borderland. I contend that in the context of the civil 
war in eastern Burma, Protestant Christianity provides a crucial vehicle for political mobilisation. 
The article shows that refugee camps in the Thai borderland become centres of proselytisation, and 
that Protestant evangelical and missionary networks open up passages across the Thai-Burmese bor-
der. The article thus considers a case where a homeland is constructed in the liminal space between 
two nations. Illegal emergency aid that doubles as missionary project reinforces the image of a help-
less victim being vandalized by evil Burmese army. 
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Dieser Artikel zeigt auf, wie es der Karen National Union (KNU) gelungen ist, die humanitäre Hilfe 
im Grenzgebiet zwischen Thailand und Burma für eigene Ziele zu manipulieren und zu politisie-
ren. Ich argumentiere, dass das protestantische Christentum ein entscheidendes Vehikel zur politi-
schen Mobilisierung im Kontext des Bürgerkriegs in Ost-Burma darstellt. Der Artikel zeigt, dass die 
Flüchtlingslager im thailändischen Grenzgebiet als Zentren der Missionierung dienen und dass die 
protestantisch-evangelikalen und missionarischen Netzwerke territoriale Korridore durch die thai-
ländisch-burmesische Grenze öﬀ  nen. Wir sehen hier ein Fallbeispiel, wie eine imaginierte Nation in 
der Grenzerfahrung zweier Nationen konstruiert wird. Soforthilfe, die mit protestantischer Mission 
doppelt, verstärkt das Bild hilﬂ  oser Opfer, die von der burmesischen Armee vandalisiert werden.
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Introduction2
In November 2010, I assisted in a meeting in which Karen pastors and intellectuals 
from Thailand and Burma as well as other Karen came together in a Bible School in 
Chiang Mai in order to read the Bible in a special way, ‘through Karen eyes’. Over 
two days, this circle tried to make sense of their ‘fate’ and to find ways to explain 
and to overcome the suffering of the Karen population in eastern Burma. The meet-
ing also involved political discussions on the future of the Karen state. Some Chris-
tian intellectuals in attendance served as mediators aiming to negotiate a ceasefire 
and peace between the Karen National Union (KNU), the Democratic Karen Buddhist 
Army (DKBA), and the Burmese government. They questioned whether violence on 
the Karen’s side was a way to peace. Until now, the KNU sticks to armed struggle 
and the mantra of never surrendering, although negotiations with representatives 
of the Burmese government for a ceasefire are underway. Other leaders regard the 
conflict as a spiritual warfare and see themselves as spiritual leaders and staunch 
nationalists.3 
Although debating in a context of a Federal Union of Burma solution, the national 
narrative of a unified Karen ethnic group remains stronger than ever. In this article, 
I argue that the Karen example provides a case where a nation is constructed, imag-
ined, and contested in the context of displacement and political exile in the margin 
of two nations (Dudley, 2007). While the physical space of a Karen homeland, the   
Kawthoolei, has been gradually lost, the spiritual idea of a ‘homeland’ is still alive. In 
fact, nationalism and national identity are reproduced in the mission and the ‘mi-
gration schools’ for Karen migrant children. Although the Karen churches have an 
independent, theological agenda, and their own programs of biblical education and 
extensive mission, Karen Protestant Christianity provides a crucial vehicle for politi-
cal mobilisation (Keyes, 1979). 
In the following, I theorise moving borders in a new way. The border has moved as 
2  In this paper, I draw on ongoing fieldwork on religious spaces and self-identification of Karen migrants across 
the  Thailand-Burma  border.  Ethnographic  research  and  survey  research  on  Christian,  Theravada  Buddhist,  and 
Animist movements was done in north-western Thailand and in eastern Burma. Co-researchers in a research project 
funded generously by the Thailand Research Fund include Kwanchewan Buadaeng and Samak Kosem, Department of 
Anthropology, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. The first draft was presented in Marseille, France, for the International 
Burma Studies Conference, 6-9 July 2010.
3  For an exciting perspective on Buddhist spaces and networks in Karen state, see Hayami (in press). 
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the control of the territory and the border itself has shifted between Thai or Burmese 
authorities and the Karen, a people that lives in both Thailand and Burma. I contend 
that religious networks and social support structures, civil society, church networks, 
and Christian Protestant communities as well as evangelist and missionary ministries 
create corridors, passages, and spaces of reconstruction in the third space of the 
liminal, extreme niche in the Thai borderland (Horstmann & Wadley, 2009; South, 
2010). Different factions within the KNU, DKBA, and Burmese army fight and compete 
fiercely over the control of territory and business licences, and religious spaces sup-
port consistent efforts of competing warlords to control areas and people. Christian 
missionary work therefore competes with Buddhist pagoda-planting and Buddhist 
charismatic authority. 
The refugee camp, largely controlled by the indigenous KNU refugee committee 
and upheld by humanitarian aid, becomes a centre of proselytisation and reproduc-
tion of Karen nationalism (Dudley, 2007; Gravers, 2007; Horstmann, 2011). Thus, dis-
placed Karen become part of globalising political and spiritual projects as national 
and Protestant Christian members of a global Karen community. After reconstruction 
in the Thai borderland, these politicised humanitarian projects re-enter the conflict 
zone inside eastern Burma to support the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), to 
support the churches or in the form of humanitarian, yet nationalistic organisations, 
to support the internally displaced Karen in the Karen state and to provide spiritual 
worship and emergency aid to them. 
Christian spirituality, militarism, and nationalism go hand in hand to fuel the 
Karen cause, the ideology of reconstruction in the Thai borderland, and the narra-
tive of spiritual warfare. Refugees do not only cross a political boundary but also a 
religious one. The literate, elite, and intellectual circles of the Baptist Karen become 
realigned and reordered in political exile. The holy bible and the missionary Karen 
script provide the basis for Christian interpretation of the national narrative and the 
transformation of the physical space of Karen land into a transcendent notion of a 
Karen land. This perspective of a Christian nation conceals the internal diversity of 
the Karen in Burma, where religious affiliations vary according to region and village 
(e.g. Gravers, 2007). 
Christians make up no more than one third of the Karen population while the 
majority of the Pwo Karen is ancestral Buddhist. However, the Christian Skaw Karen ASEAS 4(2)
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are mostly in an economically better situation and better educated than the Buddhist 
Pwo. From the Karen point of view, Christianity is not seen as a non-Karen tradition 
but as a new ritual practice or a new worship. Neither is it looked at as a change in 
tradition or custom. “Christianity and Buddhism have been converted into genuine 
Karen traditions, replacing former rituals and prayers” (Gravers, 2007, p. 232). The 
literate nationalist circles emerging in the nineteenth century, described skilfully by 
Womack (2005), have realigned and are extended to political exile, resettled Karen 
diaspora in the West and to the internet. Reading the Bible through Karen eyes also 
means reading the past anew and planning for the future. 
In this article, I discuss the role of Baptist networks in the politics of reconstruc-
tion in a contested borderland in the context of forced migration. Displaced Karen 
who cross the border depend on religious networks as social support structures and 
are politically mobilised by these. I argue that the emerging religious and national 
narrative cannot be separated from the context of civil war that has plagued the 
Karen since the escalation of the armed insurgency. It is the thesis of this paper that 
the emergence of a militarised Karen National Union in the context of the insurgency 
has consolidated a particular ethno-political national narrative associated with dis-
tinctive territorial claims. The KNU claims that the Burmese regime is committing 
‘genocide’ against them and that the Karen have to defend and protect themselves. 
In this context, I am interested how missionary and evangelical networks respond to 
the humanitarian crisis in eastern Burma. Not only have their evangelising missions 
met the refugees when they are in their most vulnerable position, they also mobilise 
inside the conflict zone across the border and proselytise on the Thai border. Thus, I 
see missionary efforts on the Thai border as a continuation of earlier efforts of Karen 
Protestant and Catholic proselytisation in Burma. 
Contested Sovereignties Across the Thailand-Burma Border
In Burma, some ethnic minorities (Shan, Mon, Karenni, Kachin, and Chin) in the bor-
derlands have developed their own nationalities and ethnic militia (Gravers, 2007). 
The Burmese state on the other hand has established a regime of differential citizen-
ship in which some people are granted citizenship rights while these are denied to 
others. The Burmese army has also waged a protracted and brutal war against the 
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ethnic nationalities’ armies at the frontiers (South, 2008). It is important to note here 
that it is the civil population that has to bear the casualties and terrible consequences 
of the war. The effects of the war are difficult to bear: They include systematic terror, 
burning of villages and rice barns, campaigns of relocation, arbitrary arrest and in-
timidation, summary executions, forced labour, sexual abuse, and rape (Grundy-Warr 
& Wong, 2002; Smith, 2007).4 Thousands of people are forced to leave the villages as 
a result of these severe human rights violations, find themselves in the jungle, on 
the mountains, roaming around without food and medical attention, and struggle 
to make their way to the Thai-Burmese border. Hundreds of thousands of people are 
internally displaced, inhabiting the Burma-Karen frontier region without much hope 
to return home. The suffering, wounding, casualties, and trauma are immense.5 
While NGOs and humanitarian agencies in Thailand and in the West report these 
human rights violations extensively, little is known about the violations on the part 
of the KNU. The villagers now find themselves intimidated and pressured from sev-
eral sides and are threatened not only by Burmese soldiers but also by the DKBA and 
KNLA which demand food, protection, and even soldiers. The protracted conflict also 
has its own dynamic and there is a number of warlords and war entrepreneurs who 
compete for business licenses and resource extraction and who do not care much 
about what side they are fighting for. The KNU regards itself as an army of angels and 
as a democratic institution, yet individual human rights abuses and extortion also 
occur on the side of the KNLA brigades. 
In the war zone of eastern Burma, Burmese citizenship has probably lost much of 
its practical value as social welfare and educational infrastructure collapse. While in 
the past the KNU-controlled territory used to function as a convenient buffer zone 
between Thailand and Burma, with the KNU being a conservative anti-communist 
force under the leadership of Bo Mya, nowadays the KNU has become a burden in the 
diplomatic re-approachment between Thailand and Burma. Today, the borderlands 
are highly contested, while the Burmese army is constantly building new alliances 
with break-away factions of the ethnic nationalities factions and is trying to instru-
mentalise these by transforming them into regular border guard forces (South, 2008). 
Rajah (1990) pointed out that the Karen rebel movement is highly unusual in that 
4  See the very informative current reports of Human Rights Watch, Karen Human Rights Group, or Thailand Burma 
Border Consortium (TBBC). 
5  See the very insightful report by TBBC (2011) on displacement and poverty. ASEAS 4(2)
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it is a largely Christian movement in a largely Buddhist environment. Visitors who 
work with the Karen are welcome, as the Karen hope that foreigners will publicise 
their ‘cause’. This has led to a lack of detachment on the part of travellers, activists, 
and scholars who have identified with the goals of the Karen. This identification has 
led to biased reports on the conflict, as Western scholarship, with notable exceptions 
(South, 2011), sympathised with the KNU that they saw as a democratic organisation 
with humanitarian goals (Rogers, 2004). The documentation of human rights viola-
tions committed by the Burmese army against the non-combatant civil population 
in the 1990s led to the rise of humanitarian assistance along the Thai border and to 
the identification of humanitarian aid workers with the KNU. Consequently, critical 
studies on the everyday life of the refugees, the Karen insurgency movement, and the 
political administration of the refugee camps are still rare.6 
This paper presents an attempt to contribute to this field. Humanitarian organisa-
tions did not only identify the indigenous refugee committee as their natural partner 
but also depended on it for the implementation of welfare projects. The KNU was 
able to manipulate humanitarian aid and to channel the resources into nationalist 
and Christian education. In this way, the aid industry building up at the Thailand-
Burma border provided crucial support and positive media coverage for the KNU that 
controlled and recruited from the camps, and benefitted from taxes (donations) and 
supplies from the Thailand Burma Border Council (TBBC). Later, the KNU also benefit-
ted from the remittances from the resettled Karen communities in the West. Many 
humanitarian aid organisations uncritically supported the KNU during the civil war 
and thus kept the military machine of the KNU alive (South, 2011). Saying this, I do 
not position myself for or against the KNU or the Kawthoolei Karen Baptist Conven-
tion or the Thai Karen Baptist Convention but simply contribute to revealing the facts 
that have been kept silent in the numerous reports of Karen Human Rights organisa-
tions and the KNU.7  
6  For a similar case of a lack of critical studies on the Shan see Jirattikorn (2011). 
7  There is a slight danger of essentialising Karen refugees in the academic exercise of demystifying and deconstructing 
Karen national or Karen Christian Protestant identity (Malkki, 1992; 1996). 
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Protestant Christianity and Karen Nationalism 
In most analyses, religion has not been part of the picture, although it provides a 
privileged lens to study the identity processes of refugees. Religion and religious 
networks critically relate to mobility on the Thai-Burmese frontier. Most of all, mis-
sionary networks and humanitarian activism are characterised by movement. Mis-
sionaries cross the border against all odds: While Kawthoolei was widely accessible, 
the Back Pack Health Workers and the missionary Free Burma Rangers (FBR) today, 
for instance, take considerable risks by entering the conflict zone to provide emer-
gency relief. Movement across the border can thus be interpreted as a religious com-
mitment. The interconnections of missionary work, humanitarian crisis, and forced 
migration also allow a fresh angle on the movement in the borderland. Where hu-
manitarian organisations cannot enter the conflict zone in eastern Burma, Christian 
Protestant networks fill the gap. 
As many of the ethnic minorities have become partly Christianised, the identity 
marker of religion becomes key in the conflict as the Baptist and Catholic churches 
operate in a nation state environment where Buddhism is not a state religion but 
the predominant one, and where popular Karen Buddhist movements vie with Karen 
Christian networks for hegemony in the villages. In present Burma, the issue of re-
ligion is much politicised as Christianity is regarded with suspicion by the Burmese 
state authorities. In Thailand, by contrast, the Christian church of Thailand is fully 
recognised by the Thai government and benefits from religious freedom. This politi-
cal tolerance has motivated the presence of multiple Christian missionary agencies 
in northern Thailand, from where they operate in the politically much more sensi-
tive environments of the neighbouring countries. Baptist and Seven Day Adventist 
networks are not the only missionary networks in humanitarian aid and relief wel-
fare, the Catholic Church is very well established through the presence of churches, 
schools, and Catholic centres. In addition, Pentecostal churches and evangelical net-
works, from the US, South Korea, and Taiwan, now have established a presence in 
northern Thailand as well and have begun to work with the poorest segments of the 
population, hill tribe minorities, drug addicts, and refugees. They have used the same 
community churches or established their own churches and have especially attract-
ed young and underprivileged people to their worship services and summer camps. ASEAS 4(2)
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Historically speaking, American Baptist missionaries played a central role in the 
development of Karen national imagination (Keyes, 1979). Catholic missionaries and 
Catholic relief welfare organisations by contrast are not tied to the KNU and the 
insurgency in the way that Baptist pastors were and are. The largely Christian Karen 
rebel movement used to control large tracts of territory in eastern Burma, operat-
ing from bases in north-western Thailand. This situation changed dramatically in 
the 1990s when the deterioration of the military situation and the large inflow of 
refugees, Karen civil population, and Burmese students required a change in strategy. 
The control of the refugees by the Thai government was heightened and refugees are 
not allowed to leave the refugee camp, although leaders of the committees go in and 
out.8 In the documentation of the Karen, there is a bias on Christianity, although the 
Christians – in several denominations – are in the minority. In access to humanitar-
ian assistance and resettlement to third countries, notably the US, Christians are 
privileged against non-Christians. Clearly, the ethnic cleansing of the Karen popula-
tion in eastern Burma was instrumentalised to further the interests of the Karen 
rebel movement. Yet, it is the armed rebellion that caused the retribution by the Tat-
madaw, the Burmese army, on the civil population that endures incredible suffering. 
Moreover, the competition of Christianity and Buddhism has become a key is-
sue. The largely Christian KNU is not only in fight with the Burmese army, but also 
with the Buddhist Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) that has allied with the 
Tatmadaw. The retreat of the KNU from its bases in eastern Burma resulted in the 
DKBA’s control of the border. The ongoing factionalism within the Karen rebel move-
ment and the withdrawal and growing dependence of the KNU on Thailand has re-
sulted in further fragmentation. International NGOs and a sophisticated network of 
religious and non-religious organisations and groups provide the social welfare wing 
of the insurgency movement (Horstmann, 2011; South, 2011). 
At the same time, the camp provides a site for mobilisation of young soldiers for 
the ‘revolution’ of the Karen. This is why the camps have become dangerous sanctu-
aries: In various instances, Burmese military and DKBA soldiers stormed the camps, 
shelling them and burning houses, and searching for KNLA soldiers. Karen national-
ism and Christianity are intimately intertwined, reinforcing each other. 
8  The best introduction on the history of the camps remains Lang (2002). See also the recent booklet by the TBBC 
(2011).
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Many scholars suggested that evangelical Protestantism is an attractive religious 
option for many marginal ethnic groups. For Karen displaced people from Burma, this 
is not entirely convincing as a substantial proportion of the Karen in Burma maintain 
their local spirit beliefs. But the Baptist minority assumes a hegemonic position in 
the Thai-Burmese borderland because of the organisational, financial, and communi-
cative strength of protestant churches and the many Karen non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs) that are operated by Christians. This becomes particularly evident in 
the refugee camps where the Christian missionary networks dominate religious life. 
The KNU and the KNLA recruit soldiers and supporters from the camps.
While the Baptist church in Burma is not directly associated with the Karen Na-
tional Union, most of the leadership of the KNU is Christian and many pastors preach 
directly for the KNU. In the words of their leaders, the Baptist church provides the 
spiritual umbrella for the ethnic nationalist movement. Furthermore, in the refugee 
camps administered by the KNU and by the Thai army, the Karen refugee committee 
is made up of KNU-pastors. When the refugee camps were established in 1984, the 
Karen refugee committee emerged as a natural partner for the evangelical mission-
ary networks that were directly involved in providing emergency welfare and as-
sistance to the Karen people crossing the border. Moreover, the first refugee camps 
emerged from the villages of the KNU families. While the population of the camp has 
become more diverse, the Karen make up the large majority, and churches as well as 
the Bible school are central institutions of cultural life in the camp.
While many ecumenical Christian and non-religious international NGOs have since 
joined the consortium, religious networks play a very important role in assisting the 
displaced people by providing them with food, clothes, and shelter. The KNU has 
thus established a network in which it is associated with many civil associations and 
NGOs. But while national identities – Burmese/Thai – do not fit the context in the 
borderland, where people are neither Burmese nor Thai, the Karen stick to the idea 
of a Karen homeland and a Karen nation. This is a case of the construction of Karen 
intellectual circles and publics and the imagination of Karen state spaces. These cir-
cles and the public focus on senior church leaders, represented by the theological 
seminaries on the Thai border and in Burma. The idea of a Karen nation governed by 
the KNU is now reproduced in and extended to the diaspora. Old Karen war veterans 
go to church with traditional clothes and full national and KNU regalia. Before the ASEAS 4(2)
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fall of the garrison of Mannerplaw in 1995, the KNU controlled vast territorial tracts 
in eastern Burma and thus constituted a quasi state and buffer state. The gate read 
‘Welcome to Kawthoolei’ and the KNU comprised its own army, its own schools and 
hospitals, as well as its own townships, bureaucracy, and flag (Rajah, 1990). The KNU 
raised substantial resources by taxing the Karen population and the illicit border 
market and by exploiting the teak forests. After the military defeat of the KNLA and 
the resettlement of Christian Karen families to the USA, Australia, and Europe, the re-
ligious reconstruction of a Karen imagined community gained importance. The KNU, 
individual families, and churches gained new income through remittances following 
this new diaspora. Religious interpretation of the Bible was used to justify a war that 
is perceived to be ‘just’. Metaphors of refugees being ‘saved on Noah’s ark’, ‘God’s 
mysterious plan’, as well as the promise of the ‘promised land’ and ‘eternal life’ were 
extensively used by Christian leaders to encourage each other. The portrayed heroic 
behaviour of the KNU was underlined by delivering emergency health services and 
prayer worshipping to the internally displaced persons in the war zone. In a sense, 
the imagination of a Christian nation is mentally transported to the refugee camp. 
Evangelical Christianity can thus be seen as a replacement of the dwindling home-
land in south-eastern Burma.
Evangelisation and Proselytisation
Facing  massive  persecution  and  violence,  and  given  their  loss  of  citizenship,  the 
Karen from eastern Burma are marginal to Thai modernity. In this situation, the hu-
manitarian aid organisations emerge as crucial allies for the KNU’s reorganisation in 
the camps and contribute to the making of ‘ethno-fiction’ by the Karen themselves, 
international humanitarian organisations, and academic scholarship (Rajah, 1990). 
Far from being passive victims, evangelical Karen become important agents of pros-
elytising, who use their cultural capital to reach out to their relatives, friends, and to 
the community of Christians. The Karen church not only provides a large selection of 
services, welfare, and relief; in addition, Christians are able to re-enter the humani-
tarian space as soldiers-medics-missionaries in a war zone largely inaccessible for 
international humanitarian NGOs. Fuelled by global alliances with American Chris-
tian churches, South Korean Pentecostals, and international advocacy networks, this 
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project of evangelisation and reconstruction is still in the hands of the educated 
Christian leadership. I also do not replace ethnic labels with new ones, but look at 
how identities are constructed in religious and nationalist movements, and contest-
ed in ‘economies of power’ that constitute the ‘field’. By forging the ethno-fiction of 
a united Karen nation, the KNU conceals vast internal differences within the Karen 
population. I argue that the invention of a united Karen leadership is a very recent 
one and that this leadership was imposed on an extremely diverse population. 
While the Baptists constitute a very eloquent minority within the Karen popula-
tion, the Buddhists are in the majority. In the Karen state, the ethnic and religious 
composition can vary from village to village. In the KNU, the leadership is mostly 
made up of Christians, while the foot soldiers are for the great majority Buddhists. 
The frustration of being locked up in the lower level of the KNU’s hierarchy was ef-
fectively used by the Buddhist monk U Thuzana who instrumentalised the status gap 
by mobilising these grievances to found his own breakaway army, the DKBA (Gravers, 
2007). 
Religious developments in the Karen state have always been very dynamic and 
conversion to Christianity was never a straightforward, uniform movement, but was 
instead characterised by ups and downs and may have encapsulated some villages 
and regions but not others. Many Karen villages remain animist and follow autoch-
thonous Karen traditions, while indigenous millenarian Buddhist movements devel-
oped in parts of the Karen state. In some areas, there was intensive religious compe-
tition and that dynamic remains until today. In a landmark study, William Womack 
showed that this competition of social networks and intellectual circles centred on 
the development and appropriation of the Karen script and on the contested im-
aginations of a Karen ethnicity (Womack, 2005). By examining Christian, Buddhist, 
and syncretised literary groups in the nineteenth and twentieth century in different 
regions of eastern Burma, Womack shows that the missionary Karen Sgaw script 
was only one among 11 different scripts, albeit the most influential one. Competing 
scripts were reproduced in the churches, monasteries, and among syncretic groups 
such as the Lekke and Telekhon, mixing Buddhist, Christian, and autochthonous ele-
ments. The nationalist Christian leadership of the KNU is, according to Martin Smith, 
only a recent phenomenon (Smith, 1991; 2007). However, this does not make the link 
between Christianity and the insurgency less important. Religion provides a very ASEAS 4(2)
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interesting lens to look at the contestation of Karen representation and territorial 
spaces in the borderland. But Womack’s work makes the perspective of Karen nation-
alism more diverse and cautions us not to make the mistake of producing a unitary 
perspective where there is none. South (2007) points out that many syncretic Karen 
in Burma identify neither with the KNU nor with the DKBA but are drawn into a vi-
cious cycle of violence. Womack is certainly right to state that the nationalist narra-
tive is filtered to foreign researchers by the KNU, the Karen refugee committee and 
Karen NGOs. 
While this diversity remains in Burma, I argue that the Baptist Christian network 
has the strongest lobby in the refugee camps and that the domination of the admin-
istration of the camps is reflected in the Christian teaching in the camp schools. 
Of course, Christianity is not a unified entity either. From the beginning, American 
Baptist missionaries proselytised along Catholic missionaries, and the Christian land-
scape of today is characterised by the co-existence of Baptist, Anglican, Seven Day 
Adventist, and Catholic community churches. In addition, other denominations com-
pete with the dominant Baptist stream, the Seven Day Adventist church being second 
place. I claim that the privileged position of the evangelic Baptist church and its 
close association to the KNU in the refugee camp results in a campaign to missionise 
refugees, and that this is what happens. Refugees, Buddhist and animist, who are so-
cialised in the migrant schools and in the humanitarian networks are exposed to and 
often convert to Christianity. The reasons for conversion are complex, though, the 
main reason is that individual refugees want to be part of the collective body of the 
Karen characterised by faith and nationalism. Christianity symbolises modernity and 
cosmopolitanism. Not least, conversion to Christianity grants access to social wel-
fare and better access to humanitarian aid and social mobility. Inside the Karen state, 
the DKBA also offers a perspective and the KNU and DKBA now aggressively compete 
over the symbols of nationalism. In both guerrilla armies, religious affiliation has be-
come a key symbol and the DKBA is involved in building pagodas and temples while 
the Baptist network is eager to plant churches. The Karen are not just recipients of 
humanitarian aid. Unlike former Vietnamese refugees who converted to Christianity, 
the Christian Karen are old Christians who have a tradition of proselytising among 
their own ethnic group and other ethnic minorities. Christian missionary networks 
are not the only religious networks in town. The cultural hegemony of the Karen 
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in the Thai borderland in north-western Thailand excludes the subaltern Buddhist, 
Islamic, and autochthonous Karen communities that construct their own religious 
landscapes in Thailand and in Burma. 
State of the Field
My research on the transnational religious lives of the Christians adds to and comple-
ments important research on the economic, political, and cultural practices of tran-
snational refugees. Brees (2010) in particular provides very valuable research about 
the remittance strategies of refugees and the practical difficulties they face. Another 
important contribution comes from Sandra Dudley whose work on the exiled Karenni 
in the Thailand/Burma borderland focuses on the transformation of Karenni refugees 
into modern, educated subjects, Karenni identification, and the rise of a Karenni 
nationalism (Dudley, 2007, pp. 77-106). The Karenni (red Karen) identity is born in the 
refugee camp and, similar to Karen identity, conceals internal diversity, contradic-
tions, tensions, and plurality in favour of a united, Christian dominated Karenni-ness. 
In a recent full monograph on the Karenni refugees in Thailand, Dudley uses a ma-
terial culture lens to analyse the formations of pre- and post-exile Karenni identity 
(Dudley, 2010). This article can thus be read in convergence with Dudley’s important 
work. The work of Michael Gravers who focuses on the messianic and Buddhist tradi-
tions of the Karen has been decisive for my thinking on sacred spaces of the Karen. 
This paper thus complements Gravers’ path-breaking on-going work on indigenous 
Buddhist millenarian movements (Gravers, 2007; 2011). 
Theoretical Considerations
Castells (1996) argues that the world is reconstituting itself around a series of net-
works strung around the globe based on advanced communication technologies. He 
claims that the network is the signature of new society. Networks are driven by mo-
dern communication technologies and reorganise geographical space by creating a 
new material foundation of time-sharing. Networks are social ties that allocate and 
control resources. They are not simply amalgams of nodes and ties, but are always 
organised around projects, goals, and values. Each network constitutes its own social ASEAS 4(2)
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world, and it is the bundle of material and immaterial resources and flexible, yet, co-
ordinated communication, which makes action possible. Clearly, I want to argue that 
religious networks very much spread through the network logic. In the Thailand/Bur-
ma borderland, the Karen Baptist Convention is a network that is organised around 
the political project of spreading Karen nationalism and Protestant Christianity that 
is based on a set of material and immaterial religious resources, and that is bound 
together by use of advanced electronic communication on a local and a global scale. 
The question of inclusion and exclusion is one of the most fundamental in network 
society. As Castells writes, the network also acts as a gatekeeper. Inside networks, 
opportunities are created while outside of them survival is increasingly difficult (Ca-
stells, 2000, p. 187). Indeed, for many people outside the existing Karen structures, 
survival becomes a daily struggle collecting garbage, working in factories, or as la-
bourers under the minimum wage, while Christian networks provide shelter, food, 
and security in a hostile environment.
The concept of a transnational social formation gives a more coherent frame for 
explaining the dynamics of durable transnational exchanges. A concise overview of 
transnational social formations is provided by Stephen Vertovec (1999; 2009). In argu-
ing that the Christian Karen community provides a case study for the trans-nationali-
sation of the social world, I follow Vertovec’s definition of transnational social forma-
tions and his proposition for empirical research on transnationalism. The Christian 
Protestant community is a transnational social formation with a special type of con-
sciousness and national identity of an exiled but ‘chosen’ people that extends to the 
Thai borderland and to the Karen diaspora in the West.
The project of the Karen community is kept alive through remittances from tran-
snational humanitarian organisation and church networks and from the growing 
diaspora. Transnationalism is an arena for transnational advocacy networks, NGOs, 
websites, and ethno-political formations in the diaspora. The transnational social 
formation has a durable spatial location in the Karen state, in refugee camps, in the 
countryside of the Thai borderland, in the migration schools, in the border town of 
Mae Sot, and in the Karen communities in the USA, Scandinavia, and Australia. The 
consciousness of a Christian Karen identity in a durable transnational space makes 
the exiled Karen diaspora a transnational social formation par excellence. This tran-
snational formation takes up the social figuration of an ethnic and religious commu-
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nity. The refugee camps, the orphanages and migrant schools are important spaces 
of proselytisation. The organisation of the refugees in missionary networks often, 
but not always, collides with the interests of the national order and contributes to 
what Salemink (2009) calls the ‘cosmopolitisation’ of the refugees. Cosmopolitisa-
tion here means a greater awareness of the world and participation in the public 
sphere, but does not necessarily translate in de-ethnicisation. While the state puts 
severe constraints on the movement of the refugees in the borderland by confining 
them to this area, Christian missionaries present themselves as saviours as they pro-
vide crucial access to humanitarian aid, social services, transnational networks and 
global ideologies that are closely associated with modernity and education. Unlike 
many other forgotten ethnic minority groups, the Karen have succeeded in reaching 
substantial public awareness and solidarity in the West.
The Re-Entry of Christian Refugees Into Burma
Christian refugees in north-western Thailand establish strategies to make a living, 
assist friends and relatives in Thailand and Burma and decrease their vulnerability 
in Thailand, depending on faith-based organisations. Family-splitting strategies are 
among the means to spread opportunities and incomes. It is very important to re-
alise that all the different spaces in which the refugees make a living are closely 
intertwined and that the church provides an institutional umbrella for activities of 
the diaspora in Thailand. For many Christian refugees, it is not enough to care for 
their own survival, but the educated Karen activists use their institutional resources 
in Thailand to re-enter Burmese territory and to actively support displaced people 
in the Karen state. Diaspora groups, Karen human rights organisations and middle-
class activists collect a mass of information on human rights violations and supply 
international organisations and NGOs in Europe and in the USA with these informa-
tion. These international groups channel resources to the activists on the ground 
coordinating education and health services to displaced people. One example is the 
Karen Teacher Working Group, which comprises volunteers from the communities 
who had to walk three weeks in the jungle to transport school materials and medi-
cine to schools in war-torn eastern Burma. The Karen Baptist Convention also uses 
institutional resources to assist the refugees at the border and displaced people in ASEAS 4(2)
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Burmese territory. Thus, pastors and evangelists who have an intimate knowledge of 
the area re-enter Burma by foot to distribute the Bible, spread the word, and to as-
sist in church services. The Back Pack Health Workers literally walk into Burma and 
provide emergency relief, in addition to many other secular and faith-based initia-
tives and grassroots efforts. The Karenni Social and Welfare Centre collaborates with 
the TBBC and the Burma Relief Centre to provide emergency relief and training and 
to document human rights abuses. Another prominent example is the Free Burma 
Rangers. The FBR was founded by a former US army special envoy who started the 
operation to provide emergency relief to displaced people in war zones. FBR is a non-
armed humanitarian group that prepares nurses to walk into war zones protected by 
the KNLA or ethnic armies. The volunteers undergo intensive health care training and 
are able to immediately help people who suffer from illness, starvation and violence. 
Video cameras and voice recorders are used to document human rights abuses. In 
the USA, FBR runs a campaign to collect donations and Christmas presents for dis-
placed people in Burma. The FBR is a missionary agent that makes no secret that it 
operates based on the Bible, but emergency work has been extended to the non-
Christian population. In the war zones, the FBR organises a ‘Good Life Club’ in which 
the volunteers entertain the children and try to encourage them. The FBR also prays 
together with the displaced people and provides church service for them. Interna-
tional prayer requests and prayer sessions are organised for Burma. The images that 
the FBR disseminates in cyberspace provide material for a powerful narrative of the 
Christian community on the suffering of the Karen and play a central role in mobilis-
ing advocacy networks and donations for the work of Karen groups. 
Concluding Remarks
In describing the agency of Karen refugee leaders in the Thai-Burmese borderland, 
I used a concept of borderlands as active spaces that spoke of interconnections as 
much as of geopolitical boundedness. Rather than seeing borders as fixed zones, it is 
more productive to see the border as constantly built up and contested through the 
actions of local agents (Horstmann & Wadley, 2006). In the nightmarish experience of 
the civil war, the Christian landscape at the Thai-Burmese border uses education as a 
crucial resource to socialise Karen refugees. Efforts of spreading the gospel in the Thai 
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borderland and in the growing diaspora are directly following earlier efforts of Chris-
tianisation in Burma from which the Karen emerged as keen evangelists who brought 
the word to other ethnic minorities. The cognitive model and map of Kawthoolei was 
imposed on the Karen and ignores their internal diversity. In the refugee camp, it is the 
image of the common ‘enemy’ and the narrative of suffering that have been exhausted 
by the Karen. In a hostile environment, and harassed by the state, unable to return 
home to Burma, the Baptist church provides a key location for mobilising the resourc-
es for a better life, solidarity with other refugees and a vision. Far from being passive 
recipients of humanitarian aid, refugees make careers in the church and emphasise 
their aspirations by actively participating in evangelical efforts. While the future of 
Kawthoolei remains locked, Christian Baptist missionaries see new opportunities for 
spreading the faith. Religious networks have established a presence and remain active 
on both sides of the border and organise many of the people who become internally 
displaced, migrants, and refugees. In that sense, the border has indeed moved much 
closer to the sanctuaries in Thailand and has made returning to Burma ever more dif-
ficult for KNU-related activists. The vision of Kawthoolei is an imaginary construction 
of territorialisation and I argue re-tribalisation in which the suffering and the humani-
tarian aid provide necessary tools for the reinvention of the Karen as chosen people 
who make references to a shared history and a shared memory to justify their claims 
to a country of their own.  
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